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Changes in EU-
Latin American 
relations 
Every two years, the Heads of 
State and Government of the 
European Union (EU) and 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean summon for a 
Summit to assess the relations 
between the two regions. The 
Fifth Summit, held in Lima 
(Peru) in May 2008, revealed 
in an apparent paradox, both 
the dynamism of the biregional 
relations, as well as the 
decreasing interest that the 
Summits elicit on both parties; 
all the while exposing the 
mounting tensions within the 
interregional relation and the 
trend toward bilateralism. 
A “network” of Partnership 
Agreements —free trade zones 
included—, are being 
promoted. It’s supposed that in 
a relatively short time, such 
“network” could cover all of 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean. However, the 
economic rise of Asia means 
greater foreign policy options 
to both regions; and 
consequently, mutual interest 
in the Summits seems to be 
diminishing. Moreover, both 
regions are going through 
political changes, Latin 
America is leaning to the left, 
while the EU is shifting to the 
right. These political changes 
include the redefinition, or, in 
certain cases, a lack of 
definition, of the regional 
integration projects in both 
sides, and a review of their 
positions in an international 
system characterized by 
profound changes in the 
distribution of power. 
The EU has been going 
through a long period of self-
absorption due —in part— to 
the political and institutional 
crisis stemming from its failed 
constitutional project and 
then, to the subsequent 
mishap of its successor 
project, the Lisbon Treaty, 
whose future is still in doubt 
after the Irish setback in June 
2008. Concurrently, the EU 
has been pushing its growth, 
competitiveness and 
employment agenda foreseen 
by the Lisbon Strategy, and 
has been debating over how to 
deal with the globalisation 
process, ad its consequences, 
such as immigration and the 
increasing social diversity it 
represents, which have lead to 
right-wing generated political 
tensions, and to the rise of 
new priorities within the EU’s 
foreign and security policy 
focus in the Union’s 
neighbouring countries. 
In Latin America —currently 
an eminently democratic 
region—, the popular vote has 
given way to a left-oriented 
political cycle that springs 
from the region’s rejection of 
neoliberal reforms, and the 
search for effective 
development strategies to 
tackle poverty and inequality. 
The region is also engaged in 
the redefinition of its 
integration schemes and 
agendas, as it seeks to 
respond to the exhaustion of 
the “open regionalism” 
model. For some countries, 
the rise of Asia reduces the 
appeal of regional integration, 
especially if such integration 
lacks the necessary flexibility 
to deepen relations with the 
Asia-Pacific area or with the 
EU. The Mercosur crisis, and, 
to a lesser extent, the Andean 
Community’s crisis, mirror 
these trends. 
Despite such trends, new 
“post-liberal” integration 
agendas are emerging. Such 
agendas weigh greater 
emphasis on political, security 
and defence issues, on energy 
cooperation and 
infrastructure policies, on the 
region’s asymmetries, and, in 
general, on non-commercial 
matters. This is the case of the 
Bolivian Alternative for the 
Americas (ALBA) and of the 
Union of South American 
Nations (Unasur). 
In this context, it is worth to 
question whether the 
interregional relation holds 
any sense. During the 
eighties, such relationship 
was propelled by the 
imperatives of democracy and 
peace in an effort to open 
greater manoeuvring space on 
the Cold War stage. However, 
since the nineties, both the 
EU and Latin America have 
turned to regionalism and to 
interregional relations, as the 
best strategies to manage the
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interdependencies stemming 
from globalization (e.i. 
environmental risks, energy 
and food security issues, 
immigration and global 
financial governance, among 
others). Additionally, regional 
approaches have also focused 
on the improvement of the 
provision of global and 
regional public goods, as well 
as on the promotion of 
enhanced global governance 
through effective 
multilateralism. 
Though this rationale remains 
valid, and despite the fact that 
the UE has followed an 
“interregionalist” model 
focused on supporting regional 
integration initiatives, the 
aforementioned political 
changes have lead to the 
“bilateralisation” of the EU’s 
engagement with the region. 
The UE, for example, has 
offered both Mexico and Brazil 
a “Strategic Partnership”; and, 
to circumvent the Andean 
Community’s crisis, it opted 
for bilateral commercial 
agreements with Peru and 
Colombia. Such bilateral bets 
are risky moves that may 
undermine the EU’s 
interregional strategy and its 
traditional  support to Latin 
American integration 
 
 
Reinforcing 
political dialogue 
In this context, political 
dialogue is indispensable. A 
revision of the dialogue’s 
purpose, agenda and format 
seems necessary. There is an 
increasing need for a better 
understanding of each other. 
There are notable 
shortcomings in the 
interpretation of the realities of 
both regions, which frequently 
lead to inadequate labels —
such as Latin American 
“populism”, or European 
“neocolonialism”— which do 
not help to understand each 
region’s dynamics. These 
stereotypes contribute to a 
social construction of the 
“other” based (to a large 
extent) on stereotypes. An 
update on the debate 
concerning both regions’s 
shared values and aimed at 
promoting common agendas 
and consensus is also needed. 
EU-Latin American and 
Caribbean relations have been 
justified by both regions’ 
shared interests and by the 
need to contribute to the 
establishment of multilateral 
principles, rules and 
institutions. Such normative 
dimension of the dialogue 
seems to be in tune with the 
current trends in international 
politics, and stems from the 
EU’s peculiar “civilian power” 
nature and from Latin 
America’s contributions to 
international law and 
multilateral governance. 
Such arrangements demand a 
more substantial agenda 
focused on the management of 
common interdependencies 
and on issues that require 
greater and better 
international regulation, such 
as immigration, environment, 
peace and security. In this 
sense, the proposals put 
forward by the Euro-Latin 
American Parliamentary 
Assembly for the “Euro-Latin 
American Charter for Peace 
and Security” and the creation 
of a biregional conflict 
prevention observatory offer 
interesting opportunities. 
Dialogue with Unasur, 
national parliaments and civil 
society may prove to be very 
relevant for both initiatives. 
The possibilities and the 
relevance of the dialogue will 
depend on the format and on 
the institutions behind the 
Summits. More specific 
agendas are needed, as well as 
the rationalization of meetings 
such as the EU-Rio Group 
Dialogue, or the San Jose 
Dialogue process between the 
EU and Central America.  
Henceforth, the creation of an 
EU-Latin American and 
Caribbean Foundation, agreed 
at the Lima Summit, could be 
particularly opportune. It 
would be an independent, 
permanent and flexible body 
that would serve to prepare 
and to follow up the Summit’s 
mandates. Where appropriate, 
such body could execute the 
Summit’s resolutions and 
those of other dialogue 
mechanisms; additionally, it 
could open dialogue with 
other actors, as well as 
promote, analyse and study 
the relations between the two 
regions. 
A more open and transparent 
process is also necessary, and 
therefore, should be better 
linked to social forums so that 
greater participation and 
ownership of the agendas is 
ensured among the relevant 
actors. Social participation is 
crucial. Almost three decades 
ago, the links between both 
regions’ political parties and 
social actors served as the 
birthplace, of the EU- Latin 
American and Caribbean 
relations. The weakening of 
the political parties in both 
regions and the emergence of 
new political actors has 
weakened those links. A more 
open political dialogue would 
contribute to its 
reestablishment. The Euro-
Latin American Parliamentary 
Assembly (Eurolat), set up 
after the Vienna Summit 
(2006), is particularly 
important here. 
 
 
A permanent 
agenda for 
social cohesion 
The formulation of 
development agendas for 
social inclusion is one of the 
keys to the current political 
cycle in Latin America, which 
seeks to tackle the region’s 
historical exclusion dynamics 
that are increasing under 
globalization’s competitive 
pressures. In response to 
those pressures, the EU is also 
seeking to adapt its own 
social cohesion model to 
address the new challenges 
posed by its enlargement 
process and by immigration.  
To achieve all this, it is 
important to set a permanent 
agenda on social cohesion, 
which goes beyond that of the 
Summits. Rather than just 
limiting the agenda to 
reducing extreme poverty, as 
underlined by the Millennium 
Development Goals, the 
agenda should place greater 
emphasis on reducing 
inequality, not just 
socioeconomic, but also 
ethnic, gender and age related 
inequalities. Therefore, in the 
efforts to enhance biregional 
dialogue and cooperation on 
social cohesion, it would be 
important to broaden the 
participation of non-
governmental actors within 
the framework of the second 
phase of the EUROsociAL 
programme.  
The core of a development 
agenda for middle-income 
countries requires a 
comprehensive approach 
that addresses both 
macroeconomic and growth 
policies, as well as 
redistribution policies, 
particularly tax reforms. 
These reforms should serve 
to ensure the sustainability 
of public investment in the 
productive sector as well as 
the sustainability of the 
social policies beyond 
cyclical export bonanzas. 
This needs to be achieved 
within the framework of a 
(re) building of the relation 
between civic rights and 
duties. Moreover, such 
relation should be based on 
a concept of citizenship, 
which implies quality of 
employment oriented 
policies and policies that 
guarantee universal access to 
a decent income and that 
include the provision of 
public health and education 
services through effective 
public action. 
This issue is already 
important within the greater 
interregional dialogue, 
nonetheless, it is necessary 
to go beyond generic 
statements and 
commitments, and follow-
up its advances through 
specific benchmarks agreed 
upon by each region, i.e., 
the Lisbon Strategy in the 
EU; and ECLAC’s social 
cohesion indicators for Latin 
America and the Caribbean. 
A more coherent approach 
on this issue will have to 
address the complex 
relationship between 
economic, social and 
territorial cohesion, and the 
Partnership Agreements, 
given that these involve a 
process of deep economic 
liberalization that may not 
contribute to the two 
region’s objectives on social 
cohesion. The current 
Partnership Agreement 
negotiations with Central 
America and with the 
Andean countries, as well as 
those entered into with 3 
 
Mercosur, involve adequately 
addressing asymmetries 
through instruments such as 
the evaluation of sustainability; 
the assurance of the special 
and differential treatment 
principle in favour of the lesser 
developed countries; the 
establishment, when necessary, 
of exceptions and transitory 
periods in specific sectors; and, 
a different approach to 
development aid, so that it 
may help support policies 
aimed at boosting a productive 
transformation and ease the 
costs of the adjustment. 
Henceforth, the European 
Parliament’s proposal to 
establish a Biregional Solidarity 
Fund supported by the 
Commission and other 
bilateral and multilateral 
donors remains interesting.  
Within the framework of the 
new “post-liberal” integration 
agendas of Latin America, new 
regional instruments are being 
created, such as the Mercosur 
Structural Convergence Fund 
(FOCEM), which is already 
operating, and, the Cohesion 
Fund foreseen by the Customs 
Union Agreement signed by 
the Central American countries 
in December 2007. These 
instruments open 
opportunities for EU triangular 
cooperation. The EU would 
make a significant political 
move if it backed these 
instruments with financial 
support; contingent, of course, 
on their consolidation, and, on 
Latin America’s and the 
Caribbean’s commitment to 
those funds. 
In view of the growing 
immigration flows from Latin 
America, it is necessary to 
recognize the fact that 
immigration is a central 
problem for social cohesion. 
Immigration is the expression 
of the globalization of labour 
markets, and like other aspects 
of globalization, requires 
adequate regulation which 
cannot only (or mainly) be 
based on national immigration 
policies. 
The main question is how to 
dovetail Latin American’s 
requests for a special treatment 
of its émigrés with the 
implementation of a European 
immigration and asylum policy 
in line with The Hague 
Programme passed by the 
Council in November 2004, 
that harbours the Return 
Directive passed in 2008 by 
EU and despised by the Latin 
American countries. This 
dilemma rests on the newly 
opened Euro-Latin American 
dialogue on migrations that 
aspires to reach a consensus 
based on the respect of labour 
and citizenship rights, and on 
the proper management of 
labour markets, avoiding the 
pitfalls of security-dominated 
views.  
Such arrangements would 
require an even more flexible 
worker mobility system, that 
allows temporary migration 
and the right to family 
reunification; the recognition 
—with the correspondent 
guarantees— of academic 
degrees and qualifications; the 
mutual recognition and 
accumulation of social security 
contributions; support to 
remittances (given their social 
impact); adequate immigrant 
savings and investment 
incentives; and, enhanced 
coherence between rights-
based immigration policies 
and domestic policies, 
particularly with regard to the 
issuance of visas. The 
EUROsociAL programme, now 
in its second phase 
(EUROsociAL II) and the 
European Parliament’s call for 
the creation of a biregional 
observatory on immigration, 
may contribute to these goals. 
 
 
The Partnership 
Agreements 
network and 
regional 
integration 
The Commission’s December 
2005 Communication, A 
Stronger Partnership between 
the European Union and Latin 
America, and the Lima 
Declaration of 2008 reiterate 
the goal of creating a network 
of Partnership Agreements 
between the EU and all the 
countries and integration 
groups in Latin America. Such 
strategy was based on the 
“integration map” of the early 
nineties, therefore planning 
bilateral agreements with 
countries that were not part 
of any Latin American 
integration process (Mexico 
and Chile), and the launching 
of interregional negotiations 
with Mercosur, the Andean 
Community of Nations 
(CAN), and the member 
countries of the Central 
American Integration System. 
These negotiations are at 
different phases. The 
difficulties posed by the free 
trade chapter serve to recall 
the stark political 
underpinnings of these 
agreements. It is important 
that these difficulties —
particularly, related to the 
Andean countries—, do not 
lead to the false dilemma of 
“all or nothing”, where “all” 
means the conventional 
format of the “WTO-plus” 
trade agreement, and 
“nothing” the abandonment 
of the interregional focus.  
This trend would lead to the 
signing of bilateral 
agreements with those 
countries willing to accept 
such format (e.i. Colombia 
and Peru), since other 
countries like Ecuador and 
Bolivia reject the investment 
and intellectual property 
rights chapter. The apparent 
“bilateral route” taken in 
response to the lack of 
agreement within the Andean 
Community, and the 
European Commission’s 
November 2008 decision to 
promote bilateral agreements 
—which entails modifying 
the original negotiation 
mandate approved by the 
Council— would impose a 
heavy toll on the EU’s 
credibility and on its 
integration support policy. 
Besides, it may prove to be 
yet another source of friction 
among the Andean countries.  
In a broader sense, it would 
also damage the current 
convergence process between 
CAN and Mercosur, which 
constitutes one of Unasur’s 
fundamental pillars. A more 
flexible format in the 
structure of the agreement 
could make the varying 
liberalization rates more 
compatible, and therefore it 
could avoid the “all or 
nothing” dilemma. In this 
sense, it is important to meet 
the commitments made at the 
Lima Summit Declaration, 
asking to pay “particular 
attention to the specific 
development needs of the 
member countries of the 
Andean Community, taking 
into account the 
asymmetries among (and 
within) the regions, and the 
need for flexibility —as may 
be required—, on behalf of 
the EU”. 
As for the EU-Mercosur 
negotiations, both the EU 
and Brazil gave priority to 
the completion of the Doha 
“Round” of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). The 
failure of that Round —at 
least for the time being—, 
should allow advances in the 
EU-Mercosur negotiation. 
For such purpose, an 
adequate combination of 
flexibility and mutual 
demands also seem 
necessary, as well as the 
search for more creative 
formulas which distance 
themselves from the 
conventional “WTO-plus” 
free trade agreement format, 
addressing the asymmetries 
between the regions, and 
maintaining a coherent 
stance on the relation 
between economic 
liberalization, social 
cohesion and the fight 
against poverty. 
In this context, it is worth 
mentioning that the progress 
made in the negotiations 
between Central America 
and the EU has positively 
contributed to further the 
integration process in that 
region. 
Finally, these agreements 
require an effort to adapt the 
EU’s aid programmes for the 
2007-2013 period, so that 
they will support policies 
aimed at transforming the 
production structure, 
improve competitiveness —
particularly that of the small 
to medium sized companies 
(SMEs)—, facilitate trade 
and physically connect 
markets, trade capabilities, 
educational, scientific and 
technological cooperation 
and the adoption of 
common policies —
including, as mentioned 
before, regional funds such 
as FOCEM— within the 
framework of regional 
integration processes. 4 
 
Energy and the 
environment: a 
common 
biregional 
agenda for 
sustainable 
development? 
With the opening of a sector-
specific ministerial dialogue, 
and the commitments made in 
Lima, the environment and 
energy have become the new 
axis for dialogue and 
cooperation between the two 
regions. This dialogue has a 
multilateral dimension aimed 
to encourage the countries that 
emit the largest amounts of 
greenhouse gases to join the 
Kyoto process and its 
successor agreement, and to 
coordinate positions in the 
talks on global warming. It 
should also contribute to the 
management of agreements 
and initiatives to improve 
international environmental 
governance, particularly 
parting from the United 
Nations, integrating structures 
and organizations that are 
currently dispersed and that do 
not have the sufficient 
resources and powers to 
ensure effective multilateralism 
in this field. 
Transforming energy policy 
into an integration axis is 
another component of this 
agenda. There is great 
potential, given the high 
degree of complementarity 
between countries and regions 
that are mainly producers or 
consumers of energy; between 
supply and demand cycles; 
and, between countries with 
different technological 
capacities. However, the 
fragmentation of the markets 
and of the regulatory 
frameworks, combined with 
the primacy of national 
policies in a context that lacks 
a regional vision, has limited 
its potential. The biregional 
dialogue —complemented 
with the EU’s cooperation—, 
could promote the physical 
interconnection of the region’s 
infrastructure, create common 
energy markets, and help 
advance the adoption of an 
energy security strategy for the 
region. 
There are also possibilities for 
cooperation in the renewable 
sources sector (technology 
transfer, the design of legal 
frameworks and incentive 
systems, and, investment 
financing). Such measures 
could help diversify the energy 
model in both regions, reduce 
emissions, and improve 
energy security. Countries 
from the region, like Brazil, 
have considerable capabilities 
to produce biofuels at lower 
costs and emission levels than 
their European equivalent. 
The EU, for its part, has a 
significant technological 
background in the wind and 
solar energy sector, and could 
finance the transferral of 
technologies through carbon 
funds, Kyoto Protocol 
mechanisms, funds from the 
7th R&D Framework-
Programme, loans from the 
European Investment Bank, 
and, if created, both regions 
could further benefit from the 
resources gained from a global 
emission rights market in 
which design both parties 
must be involved. In any case, 
given the impact of biofuels on 
the environment, farming, 
food prices, poverty and 
malnutrition, it is necessary to 
tackle this issue from different 
angles that are sensitive to 
economic efficiency and to the 
environmental and social 
costs. 
Finally, it is necessary to 
incorporate adaptation 
strategies to global warming 
within the EU- Latin 
American cooperation 
framework. At the regional 
level, the “Euroclima” 
initiative, launched at the 
Lima Summit and still 
without a specific structure, 
could be a useful framework 
if it is endowed with the 
proper design and the 
necessary resources. 
 
Final remarks 
With more than three decades 
of history, the relations 
between the two regions 
express the strategic options 
of the EU and Latin America 
that transcend the concrete 
results of each Summit. To a 
great extent those options 
continue to be relevant. The 
Summits should be seen as an 
opportunity to give such 
strategies greater visibility and 
political momentum. There is 
a broader agenda focused on 
multilateralism, Partnership 
Agreements, social cohesion, 
peace and security, and 
increasingly relevant issues, 
such as immigration and 
climate change. However, the 
current dialogue should adapt 
its format and content to 
better address the ongoing 
changes within the 
international system as well as 
to those occurring in both 
regions. These changes are 
leading to readjustments in 
the interregional relations, 
and to the emergence of a 
bilateral trend whose costs 
and benefits should be 
carefully weighed and 
considered before the 
credibility of Latin America’s 
regional integration process 
and the EU’s policy in the 
region. 
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Note: The analysis made in this ICEIPaper is partially based on the conclusions and outcomes of the biregional seminar organized in Buenos Aires and in 
Madrid in March and April 2008 by ICEI, Universidad Tres de Febrero (UNTREF), the Iberoamerican Secretariat (SEGIB), FRIDE, the Fundación Carolina 
and the Casa de América. The author would like to thank Celestino del Arenal, Anna Ayuso, Adrian Cannellotto, Manuel Cienfuegos, Javier Fernández, 
Christian Freres, Susanne Gratius, Tomás Mallo, Jóse Paradiso and Felix Peña for their comments and contributions.  
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